



Director of
Central
Intelligence

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300130002-8

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National Intelligence Daily

*Monday
16 April 1979*

State Dept. review completed

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


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The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the final section of the *Daily*, will often contain materials that update the Situation Reports and Briefs and Comments.

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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

ISRAEL: Palestinian Attack

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Israeli security officials are concerned that yesterday's unsuccessful Palestinian commando attack on an Israeli settlement--the second such attack in less than five weeks--may mean that Jordan has abandoned its policy of preventing commando infiltration from Jordanian territory. We doubt that Jordan has changed its policy; the attacks probably reflect a redoubling of Palestinian efforts since the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and possibly more professional preparation. Both factors make it more difficult for the Jordanians to detect such raids.


Israeli Chief of Staff Eytan reportedly told a group of settlers that the attack could not have taken place without Jordanian foreknowledge. Other defense officials were quoted as saying that Tel Aviv takes a "severe view" of the upsurge in attacks from Jordan. These statements are probably intended to remind Jordan that Israel will not hesitate to retaliate against Jordanian targets if it believes Amman is permitting commando attacks.

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USSR-ROMANIA: Differences in CEMA

Several indications point to uneasiness by some East European countries about Soviet efforts to expand the commitments of the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance beyond Europe. Romania, as usual, has taken the lead in resisting the Soviets, but the behavior of other East European leaders suggests they find it easier to give rhetorical support for Third World countries like Vietnam (CEMA's newest member) and Afghanistan than to include them in long-term economic plans that require East European investment.

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Recent statements by Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak leaders also suggest that they have reservations about Moscow's efforts to get the East European states to share the Soviet economic aid burden in the Third World.

Several sources suggest that Hungarian First Secretary Kadar and Polish First Secretary Gierek did not get all the commitments for economic assistance that they sought during their visits to Moscow last month. Instead they were pressed to support long-term CEMA projects on Soviet territory on a scale they feel their countries cannot afford.

In contrast to President Brezhnev's speeches during their visits, neither Kadar or Gierek mentioned the "socialist commonwealth" or the need to increase economic integration. Even Czechoslovak Premier Strougal in an article in *Pravda* on 1 March argued that there are limits to East European investments in long-term programs.

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OVERNIGHT REPORTS


(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)



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
Iran

Foreign Minister Sanjabi resigned yesterday, according to Tehran radio. Sanjabi reportedly cited the "collective responsibility" of the cabinet as the reason for his resignation but offered no further explanation. Observers in Tehran speculated that the resignation may be linked to growing concern by the government about the actions of Iran's Islamic committees.



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